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ECONOMIC SURPLUS AND THE LAW
By Harold H. Healy of the Denver Bar
(J paper presented to the Law Club)
I HAVE often amused myself by some theorizing as to the
influence of economic surplus and its attempted distribu-
tion or re-distribution by lawyers, juries and judges in the
administration of the law. Even leaving out of consideration
the more patent legislative attempts by way of graduated in-
come and inheritance tax laws and the like, I find that the
subject still remains one of delightful and intangible vastness.
Law has been defined as a rule of human conduct, a rule
of action. 36 C. J. 957. Or as Judge Burke puts it in 71 Colo.
495, 208. Pac. 465-466 (Travellers Insurance Company vs.
Industrial Commission), "A law is a rule of action prescribed
by authority." Yet the operation of that law must to some
degree rest upon facts, and, in turn, facts may rest upon legal
fictions, which are defined by Judge Denison in 74 Colo. 95,
219 Pac. 222-224, as "The assumption for the purposes of
justice of a fact that does not or may not exist."
So much for the citation of authority. With these neatly
and accurately cited (even if they be not apropos) I may be
relieved from further citation or further accuracy throughout
the length and breadth of what follows.
If law is a rule of human conduct, and legal fictions,
which may be inventions from non-existent facts, may control
the rule, and if necessity is the mother of invention, then we
may look in turn to the human necessities, as well as to human
nature, to play their inevitable part in controlling conduct and
inventing new rules or new adaptations of the older rules of
law. Moreover, if, as we all know, law is an exact science, we
know equally well that such science is swayed by human ele-
ments, and what is more human than to compare one person's
financial worth with another's lack of it.
Human necessities become such largely by comparisons,
and by standards referable to the existence of economic sur-
plus owned by oneself or some one else. And those who have
it, in getting and trying to hold on, very naturally look at law
and government very much differently than those whose eco-
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nomic surplus is featured chiefly by its absence. Political
lines between conservatives or reactionaries and liberals, so-
cialists or radicals are thereby drawn. Legal theories and
principles are no less so affected.
This tendency is apparent from the beginnings of our
common law, even when religion is supposed to have had so
much greater influence upon human conduct than at present.
And it was almost as though two distinct parties existed. In
real property, the clergy and landed nobility evolved and
foisted upon us entailed estates, uses, family trusts, restraints
on alienation, perpetuities-and the forces opposed, who aimed
to make economic surplus, represented by land, freely dis-
tributable (alienable was the word) evolved and foisted upon
us equally involved rules agairnst perpetuities, against re-
straints on alienation, unreasonable trusts for accumulation,
and methods for barring entails and other future contingent
interests. Even the last stronghold (not controlled by statute)
appears about to go. The contingent remainder now, by the
modern rule in equity, is to be considered as freely alienable
as the vested remainder. (See Knutson vs. Hederstedt (Kans.)
264 Pac. 43.)
Modern times with present day business and economic
conditions also show the ever present desire to distribute some
one else's economic surplus with a fitting reluctance to part
with one's own. And changing conditions as to diffusion of
wealth or goods, or surplus (which after all is largely rela-
tive) results in much changed law-just as the luxury of
twenty or forty years ago has become common property and
common necessity now. At least if not common property, the
same thing is commonly owned.
Among the present day tendencies which occur to me as
distinctively changing, or as having changed, from the eco-
nomic point of view, or diffusion of ownership are the follow-
ing: automobiles, telephones, oil and gas, aviation, prohibi-
tion, big business combinations (the European cartel, and the
American trust or holding company) the widespread invest-
ment field for corporate and other securities, and various blue
and mottled skies, better business bureaus, foreign corpora-
tions (covering the country with Maine or Delaware or other
favorably disposed state corporations) installment and credit
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buying, insurance and old age pensions, woman's economic
independence, divorce and alimony, the apathy of the voting
class in public and corporate elections, advertising, etc., etc.
This completes the paper. What follows as I have said,
amounts to a series of contemplative speculations on the law
as it was, is now and ever shall and may be--or the glory of
the common law.
An important factor has been the effect of the automobile.
In the early days of the industry, only the wealthier members
of the community owned, enjoyed or operated them. The
horse, the buggy, the livery stable remained for the econom-
ically common people-but not so the rule of agency appro-
priate to the common diffused ownership of the horse and
buggy. "A frolic of one's own" with a horse and buggy
whereby the owner was only liable for acts of the driver ac-
tually in the scope of his employment, was a very different
thing where such frolics were done with property belonging
only to the wealthy. And the family purpose doctrine was
evolved. "Came the Ford" cinematically speaking, and to
that extent distributed economic surplus in its own character-
istic, care free, and happy way. To hold to the family pur-
pose doctrine against a Ford owner might be to take away
from him who already hath not. And now the courts are
showing a tendency to back away from that doctrine, and to
revert to earlier and more logical rules of Agency-and to
deny liability, where the person to whom the machine was
loaned was a competent driver. Where the driver is of known
incompetence, in control of a machine, the earlier rules of
agency would still hold the owner liable. (As illustrating
this see note, 36 A.L.R. 1141.) The cases and the conflict ap-
parent appear in A.L.R. notes from 5 A.L.R. 226 to 50 A.L.R.
1512. Colorado with a fine disregard for economics and, per-
haps, a finer regard for precedent, holds with the family pur-
pose doctrine. (See Boyd vs. Close 257 Pac. 1079, 1081.)
And even if the cases nominally retain the family purpose
doctrine, courts may and do find that the facts of a particular
case do not warrant the application of the rule, or else add
other principles upon which recovery may be sustained-and
thereby weaken the rule or show the tendency already con-
tended for.
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The law of airplane collisions may well follow the law
of automobiles. Although my own prognostication is that it
will not-not only because of the influence of admiralty law
rules relating to collision, but that "family purpose" (there
being few travelers in the air except in airplanes, or possibly
parachutes), will not find its way in aviation law.
Another tendency in modern business is the widespread
use of interstate corporations. The doctrine was evolved that
if a foreign corporation had not qualified to do business, it
could not invoke the aid or protection of the local courts.
That appears to me to be an economic surplus problem. And
I also feel that now that companies are largely increasing their
activities, by merger and otherwise, and their diffused stock
ownership is becoming more widespread, by individual and
investment trust buying, whereby the economic surplus is dis-
appearing, that the tendency is and will be to regard such trans-
actions wherever possible as interstate commerce, and so under
the protection of the Federal Constitution. Or else if not that,
to hold that the business in question is a mere isolated transac-
tion, and not such as to constitute doing business in the state-
which appears to be illustrated by the Oregon case of Rush-
ford Lumber Co. vs. Dolan 260 Pac. 224, where there was a
sale of lumber in interstate commerce, then on refusal, a stor-
age, then a-removal, then a resale to the defendant in the case,
under such circumstances that other earlier decisions might
have held that the foreign corporation was doing business in
the State of Oregon, and hence not entitled to recover judg-
ment in the courts of that state. Perhaps the law of quasi
contracts may be developed to allow a recovery in the future
in such cases, as an unjust enrichment, or equity may intervene
in some way. And I seize upon the law of quasi contract to
support my thesis. Particularly those cases which allow a
recovery for goods which have changed hands by reason of
reliance upon an unsigned contract, in spite of the defense
of the Statute of Frauds, because of the otherwise unjust en-
richment. And isn't it reasonable to speculate or conjecture
that the application of the Statute of Frauds is going to be
modified by the predominate use of telephones in transacting
business.
Then we have the railroads which have been good eco-
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nomic surplus distributors. After "stop, look, and listen"
as a defense for railroads in the earlier days, the railroads, by
a series of odious comparisons, became so economically su-
perior, that it became the acceptable thing to solve a problem
in economic surplus, by the rule of last clear chance, by the
aid of which the old defense of contributory negligence could
be shunted, and thereby permit the surplus to be painlessly
transferred to the party who was economically in the right.
And that too in jurisdictions which had abandoned the rule
of comparative negligence. I don't recall many cases where
last clear chance has amounted to very much where an auto-
mobile collision between two cars in the same price class was
involved. Now, since the war, we have had a lot of fancy
propaganda that railroads are running branch lines, and cer-
tain passenger and freight business at a loss, due to apparent
competition with trucks, busses and family overland trips.
And I seem to notice latterly that "stop, look, and listen" is
staging quite a comeback, and is approximating a good deal
more its English and railroad meaning. A member of this
bar I believe, won a case recently before the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Kutchma vs. A. T. & S. F.
Ry. Co. 23 Fed. (2nd) 183) on the proposition that "stop,
look, and listen" has a meaning all its own. And the Colorado
cases lately do not seem to be quite so willing, ready and able
to see that the railroad had the last clear chance to avoid a
collision with one in a position of danger who had eyes and
ears; but saw and listened not.
We have all of us recently seen some examples of stock-
holders being considered in corporate reorganizations after
the friendly receivership route. Apparently railroad stock-
holdings potentially may be so widely diffused that even a
railroad stockholder is to be given a chance to retain some-
thing of his own.
Insurance companies are still good legitimate prey. So
that differences in economic status justify a different rule than
might be applied to ordinary contracts. The stock of insur-
ance companies is not very widely held. Their loans and in-
vestments are widely diffused, but the loans are owned by the
company, and even in that they are competing with other busi-
nesses of investment. Even a mutual policy holder doesn't
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have very much in common with the company's surplus, in a
personal way; but only in the "classic sense". Consequently
the contract or policy is to be construed most strongly against
the insurer. (Jennings vs. Brotherhood etc. 44 Colo. 68; and
as to uncertainties, Western Assur. Co. vs. Bronstein 77 Colo.
408. Many other Colo. cases to the same effect.)
Any agent or broker is considered as the agent of the in-
surer and not of the insured, especially where it is sought to
bring home notice to the insurer (general rules of agency here
may be somewhat strained). And warranties are not what
they used to be. They are representations, now for the most
part, and if false are not to avoid the contract unless clearly
shown that if the falsehood had been known, the company
would not possibly have issued the policy. Short term incon-
testable clauses, as after one year, should mean incontestable
for any cause, as a statute or period of limitation (See notes, 6
A.L.R. 452, and 13 A.L.R. 674). And even- fraud which
might ordinarily go to the vitiating of most contracts or other
relationships sinks in the limbo of the non-contestable. And
all very proper. "The business of the insurer is to insure."
So too workmen's compensation may mean a good deal
that would surprise you on questions of injury in the course
of employment, master and servant and other like matters.
Oil companies may be in a much better case. At one cent
a share they have offered so much opportunity for speculative
and dreamed of profits, that with some people they have be-
come almost as much of a family necessity as wall paper.
And so when recently one company was sued as a trespasser
for drilling a dry hole and thereby damaging what might
otherwise have had a speculative value the company was ex-
cused, even under conditions of some economic disparity.
For both plaintiff and defendant may have had the same
speculative surplus.
Other suppositions readily come to mind-the discretion
of the chancellor in equity cases for specific performance,
which is only exercised to maintain so far as possible an even
economic balance; economic general prosperity, chain stores,
sale on consignment, monopoly and the rules relating to price
fixing, and so on, and so on.
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Now assuming that there is any basis at all for the con-
clusions I have been trying to reach-and I don't need to
assure you that there isn't-it might appear from the start of
the common law down through the ages, that when some new
economic force, combination or business system and condition
begins to be felt that the person with the economic surplus
gets the first break and imposes a rule of law designed to hold
his own property-so with entails, restraints, uses, perpetui-
ties, ultra vires as a corporate defense, lack of warranty and
the like. Then comes the urge of the dividers and the pen-
dulum reverses itself. And as the industry grows older and
more settled,.and the law of supply and demand evens up what
was once surplus, the pendulum comes back to center, and
legal rules come more nearly to logical principles. Con-
sciously and unconsciously judges as well as juries consider
economic surplus in deciding cases and making law.
Thus more and more the analysis of the economic status
of a client as compared with that of the client of opposing
counsel becomes part of a lawyer's task, particularly where
new law is involved. In addition, such analysis may be of
great service in the pleasant duty of fixing fees.
Although we most of us remember from law school days,
a feeling that the number of legal principles is after all very
small, yet we have built up a legal system in the practice of
law that has become amazingly cumbersome and complex by
simply gathering up thousands and increasing thousands of
cases together and attempting to attach them to classifications
adopted years ago; or even more confusing by making new
doctrines that might appear to fit one particular case, without
any classification. In spite of the truth that a single case or
a number of cases will not prove a principle alone.
Judges, too, exalt cases, and convenient group citation of
cases by means of encyclopediae and corpora juris, as though
the case were the thing, rather than the principle, and over-
look the real consideration of the real spirit of the common
law, based upon comprehensive knowledge of the whole social
and economic structure--constantly functioning and changing
as it is-and illuminated by history and experience and human
psychology, which should be our guide if we are to hold fast
to that which is good.
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In the old days, when judges and lawyers grew up in the
simpler social and economic environment it was much easier
to evolve rules of human conduct compatible with existing
conditions. And the carefully written text-book or a decision
based upon logical reasoning was the guide to the legal de-
cision. Now, without that careful study, in the modern spirit
of haste, a mass of decisions are piled and cited together in
one of the commercial publications. And we let it go at that,
a mechanical problem in mass production, without consider-
ing new economic facts. And the best, or rather the most
conspicuous lawyer tends to be a mere mechanic. No wonder
that when a case is finally decided the judge prefers to base
his decision on a conflict in the evidence in the court below
wherefore it should be affirmed; or by saying something like
this: "Plaintiff in error claims that the judgment below
should be reversed for three reasons. At least one of those
grounds is good. The case will therefore be reversed for a
new trial in accordance with this opinion". Or to pick a case
at random (and not the most typical of the citation method)
look at Model Land & Irrig. Co. vs. Baca Irrig. Ditch Co. 262
Pac. 517, 518, wherein the Court says:
"The rule of public policy which prevents the
running of such statutes against the state, 37C. J. p.
710, Sec. 28, or against the public or a considerable
portion of the public, Davidow vs. Griswold 137
Pac. 619, would clearly warrant the court in raising
the bar of its own motion and that procedure in a
proper case has been upheld 46 Cal. App. 287, 89
Pac. 346."
I quote that without any disrespect, without any view as to
whether the authorities cited are right or wrong, pat or ir-
relevant, and with no bias as to logic in reasoning, but merely
to partially illustrate, and not a very good illustration either,
a tendency to put a proposition, and base a decision upon some
citation contained in Corpus Juris or some case cited therein,
rather than from reasoning based on the facts of the case, or
the general economic structure. And we all know that in the
average encyclopedic work many unrelated subjects are group-
ed together i.e., leaseholds of dwellings are grouped with
leaseholds of railroads; a contract to marry is grouped with
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a speculative contract to purchase stocks, and their differences
considered as relatively minor. Or again to illustrate: There
are two lines of old cases involving the validity of contracts
not to compete--often considered in square conflict. But when
the facts are examined in accordance with their economic
significance, the cases holding the contract invalid are those
involving employees' promises not to compete with their em-
ployers after the term of employment (according to contem-
porary guild regulations then in force-if not according to
distribution of economic surplus). The cases holding the
promises valid, are cases of promises by those selling a busi-
ness, and promising not to compete with the purchasers: also
sound. Still I notice in the late New York Appellate Divi-
sion case of Ward Baking Co. vs. Tolley Cake Corporation
275 N. Y. Supp. 75, with two justices dissenting the majority
of the Court upheld an injunction against a former employee
restraining him from competing with his former employer
upon a promise made by him not to compete for ten years
within one hundred miles of New York City. Unless this
may be justified by reason of the change in the economic sys-
tem caused by national advertising it is contended that this
decision is wrong under my previously announced theory, and
should be reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence it would seem that there may well be evolved a
new grouping of legal principles, or a re-classification of pres-
ent titles under which the subject of law has hitherto been
divided, and under which our daily search into the minutiae
of the law is conducted. And when, as and if that is done, if
a scientific consideration and evaluation of the inter-relation
of economic factors and legal principles be made, then the
theory of economic surplus may be given its proper place. In
such case that great contribution to the administration of jus-
tice, and human government, which is the spirit of the com-
mon law, may replace blind adherence to mass production of
mere decisions. Through such a restatement whether by the
American Law Institute or otherwise, the problem of the law-
yer may be simplified, and dignified beyond that of a mechanic
to that of student, thinker, and guide, and his way made clear
by the light of modern, seeing and comprehending reason,
instead of by unprecedented volume of precedented decision.
